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wo years after the world economy suffered a nervous breakdown in the wake of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, global financial markets remain unsettled, and the recovery that started so 
vigorously in 2009 seems to be stalling. 
The slowdown has predictably led to calls for further fiscal and monetary stimulus. The argument seems 
simple: only a massive dose of government spending and massive central-bank support for the financial 
system prevented a slide into a second Great Depression, so more of the same medicine is now needed to 
prevent a slide back into recession. 
This argument seems particularly strong in the United States, which during the long boom years grew 
accustomed to unemployment rates of around 5% and steady growth in consumption. But, in assessing the 
outlook for the US economy, one should not compare quarterly growth rates and the current unemployment 
rate of almost 10% to the ‘goldilocks’ bubble period. A longer-term view is required, since the US is facing a 
structural adjustment challenge that will be accompanied by high unemployment. 
The key challenge for the US economy (as for Southern Europe) is to move away from the consumption and 
housing-led growth model of the last decade. President Barack Obama has encapsulated this challenge by 
setting the goal of doubling US exports over the next decade. But this is easier said than done. 
The structural shift towards exports will be difficult and time-consuming, mainly because producing the 
high-tech goods that the US should be exporting requires a skilled workforce, which has largely been lost 
and cannot be re-created overnight. During the ten years preceding the peak of the bubble in 2007, about four 
million jobs were lost in the US manufacturing sector, whose share in total employment fell from more than 
17% to 12%. Unemployment remained low because the booming domestic economy created enough jobs in 
services and construction. 
Reversing this shift would seem to be impossible. Most construction workers are rather low-skilled and thus 
cannot be re-deployed to modern high-tech manufacturing. The same applies to real estate agents, social 
workers, and managers of credit card accounts. 
During the bubble years, the situation was exactly the opposite: most of the workers released by a rapidly 
shrinking manufacturing sector could be employed easily in construction and social services, which require 
only low skills (likewise, real estate services demand only rather general skills.) 
The key point is not that manufacturing jobs are somehow better, but rather that we must consider the 
asymmetry in the structural adjustment process. It is relatively easy to manage a structural shift out of 
manufacturing during a real estate boom, but it is much more difficult to re-establish a competitive 
manufacturing sector once it has been lost. 
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Post-bubble economies thus face a fundamental mismatch between the skills available in the existing work 
force and the requirements of a modern export-oriented manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, there is very 
little that economic policy can do to create a strong exporting sector in the short run, except alleviate the 
social pain. Labour market flexibility is always touted as a panacea, but even the highest degree of it cannot 
transform unemployed realtors or construction workers into skilled manufacturing specialists. Experience 
has also shown that retraining programmes have only limited success. 
Ironically, Germany might provide the most useful template for the problems facing US policy-makers. 
Germany experienced a consumption and construction boom after unification, with full employment and a 
current account deficit. After the boom peaked in 1995, one million construction workers were laid off and 
could not find jobs elsewhere. The German economy faced a decade of high unemployment and slow 
growth. 
Exports did not constitute a path to recovery because the DM was overvalued, and some manufacturing 
capacity had been lost during the unification boom. ‘International competitiveness’ became the mantra of 
German economic policy-making. But it still took more than ten years for Germany to become the export 
powerhouse it is today. 
It is unlikely that the adjustment process will be much faster in the US, where the manufacturing base has 
shrunk much more sharply. Moreover, with the introduction of the euro, Germany had the advantage of 
pegging its currency to Southern Europe, which was experiencing a housing boom even more extreme than 
in the US, thus providing German exporters with growing markets and little competition. By contrast, the US 
dollar is tied to the renminbi, whose issuer – China – has the world’s largest and fastest-growing export 
sector. 
How long will the US adjustment take? Since the peak of the bubble, the US economy has not even been 
moving in the right direction. The contraction in manufacturing output and employment has actually 
accelerated –  and faster than output and employment have fallen in the sectors on which the economy 
remains dependent for much of its growth: domestic services, such as health care, and finance, insurance, 
and real estate services (the sector responsible for the crisis). 
As long as this trend continues, only high and continuing doses of fiscal and monetary expansion will be able 
to sustain domestic demand. A self-sustaining recovery requires structural adjustment first. 